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Abstract
Like Janus, conformity has two faces. On one face, 
conformity allows social cohesion to accomplish 
mission-specific activities. On the other face, confor-
mity in educational leadership can entail a three-part 
cost against human development. First, education 
leaders may lose the capacity to ground ethics in objec-
tively valuable sources. This is an effect of formal and 
informal institutional incentive structures and pres-
sures leaders of virtue to become managers of demand. 
Second, conformity signals to institutional actors that 
authentic reform might be too costly to one’s profes-
sional career. Third, conformity signals that bureau-
cracies are not merely locations of special interests, 
but they are also locations of information dissipation 
in decision-making. All of these combine to show that 
the institution of education suffers a significant loss of 
creativity and innovation, making leadership a dif-
ficult occupation. A discussion of reliable remedies for 
practice follows.
The Modern Ethical Leader as the Effective Leader
This is an article about the less obvious obstructions to 
ethical leadership and the limits to education reform. 
Any time recent theories of education reform have 
sought wider autonomy in decision-making, center-
ing ethical reform in a local decision-maker such as 
a school principal, they have typically been thwarted 
by institutional rules and their central control (An-
gus, 1997). The tenacious grip of political interests 
and factions has had remarkable survivability, as have 
Rawls’s (1955) procedural rules that attempt to regulate 
practice (tightly coupling practice to narrow rule-sets), 
both requiring a central authority to umpire conflict. 
Political scientist Terry Moe (2003) observes further that 
“with rare exceptions, reforms that make it through 
the political process tend to be those that are acceptable 
to established interests and that leave the fundamen-
tals—and problems—of the current system intact” (p. 56).
Looking at education reform and the reformer without 
taking account of the institution ignores important op-
erative variables. Institutional economist Doug North 
(1990), for example, suggests that while institutional 
change is possible, institutional stability is a competing 
interest: “Stability is accomplished by a complex set of 
constraints that include formal rules nested in a hier-
archy, where each level is more costly to change than 
the previous one” (p. 83). As with many large-scale 
institutions, education tends to support conformity not 
transformation; its movements are incremental, some-
times glacial, not punctuated and fluid. Conformity 
in actor dispositions, in professional practices and in 
policy discussions may not be the desired or intended 
outcome of reform-minded actors, but it is too often 
the unintended outcome; as political and social theo-
rists suggest, group think is self-reinforcing.
Conformity occurs because the educational leader can-
not readily bring about an alternative ethical frame-
work. Because wider community recognition is condi-
tioned by and rooted in institutional rules and patterns 
of practice, change requires both a heroic effort, in-
cluding bearing a potential cost to one’s career, as well 
as political and entrepreneurial skill. The alternative 
ethical framework may possess sufficient depth and 
legitimacy to the local learning community, but be-
cause it runs contrary to the wider rule-set alternative 
ethical frameworks are less likely to capture agenda. 
While a local community may tolerate some change at 
the margins here or there, the institution of education 
at all levels tends to resist and confine any transform-
ing impulses by its actors (Rodriguez, Loomis, and 
Weeres 2007). The norm-maintaining institution re-
stricts transformational change because in most cases 
significant change entails risk: it would bring about 
higher levels of uncertainty, possibly radical alterations 
in existing rules and within relations, and perhaps 
even bring about a diminishment or end to certain 
interest groups within the institution. The risk averse 
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environment of course has been true of institutions for 
centuries. The present reality, however, suggests that 
theories of educational leadership in the U.S. today 
are not in fact ethically transformational, but embrace 
institutional conformity. We who train leaders as well 
as the leaders themselves talk about ethical reform, yet 
the rhetoric does not match performance; conformity 
conscripts intention to perform according to the rules 
of the game (Coase 1994).
In a 2005 edition of Education Week an advertise-
ment recruiting principals to turn around schools 
in New York City read, “The NYC [New York City] 
Leadership Academy is working to build a team of 
great principals who are strong transformational and 
instructional leaders…[they] will be the key to improv-
ing overall school and student performance and will 
inspire teachers, students and parents in urban public 
schools to reach their highest potential” (2005, p. 43). 
This is not dissimilar to what Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
deemed the highest calling of the political leader when 
he identified education as key to national strength 
and stability. Rousseau (1947) said, “He who dares to 
undertake the formation of a people must feel himself 
capable of changing human nature itself, and of trans-
forming each individual” (p. 228). Current theorists 
find it difficult to agree on what Ethical Leadership 
is, but they have little difficulty defining what Ethi-
cal Leadership does. The Ethical Leader will develop 
and sustain positive change to transform individuals 
thereby transforming the society in which they live. 
This was the basis for Rousseau’s statement and is the 
basis for the advertisement in Education Week. The 
NYC Leadership Academy wants leaders who will not 
only inspire the education process, but will also arouse 
the surrounding community so it may reach a level of 
success in human development not attainable before 
the transformation.
Many leadership theorists center their arguments in 
what leaders do (their action) rather than on whom 
leaders are (their character), making theories of Ethi-
cal Leadership pragmatic and utility-driven rather 
than seeking deeper ethical questions around human 
development. One of the most popular modern lead-
ership theorists is Michael Fullan. Fullan authored 
many books on leadership in business and education 
and is a leading thinker on educational leadership. For 
brevity, we will use Fullan as the archetypal theo-
rist in this area. In his book Leading in a Culture of 
Change (2001), Fullan simplifies his widely accepted 
view of ethical leadership as effective leadership, and 
in a follow up work entitled, The Moral Imperative 
of School Leadership (2003) he further develops his 
understanding of moral purpose as coming from the 
moral imperative of public education. Here, according 
to Fullan (2001), leadership “is not mobilizing others 
to solve problems we already know how to solve, but to 
help them confront problems that have never yet been 
successfully addressed” (p. 3). According to the theory, 
moral purpose causes the leader to be ethical, by which 
he means “acting with the intention of making a posi-
tive difference in the lives of employees, customers and 
society as a whole” (p. 3). For Fullan, an ethical leader 
is a person who helps people to confront their prob-
lems thus allowing the problems to be solved by the 
people involved in a specific community, which will 
make a positive difference in their lives. He ascribes to 
these leaders the adjective “effective” because they have 
caused “more good things to happen and fewer bad 
things to happen” (p. 11).
In summary, leadership, if it is to be effective, has 
to (1) have an explicit ‘making-a-difference’ sense of 
purpose, (2) use strategies to mobilize many people to 
tackle tough problems, (3) be held accountable by mea-
sured and debatable indicators of success, and (4) be 
ultimately assessed by the extent to which it awakens 
people’s intrinsic commitment, which is none other 
than mobilizing of everyone’s sense of moral purpose. 
(p. 20)
For many leaders and administrators in education Ful-
lan’s ideas carry great weight and influence. His ideas 
make sense, seem reasonable and are probably attain-
able in the right institutional environment. But there 
may be a miscalculation for leaders who hold to and 
practice Fullan’s model of leadership, especially if they 
regard it as an adequate ethical model of leadership. 
Central weaknesses of such models are, first, a failure 
to account for the myriad dimensions and effects of 
a norm-maintaining institution on the dispositions 
and practices of leadership. Second, the model places 
inordinate hope in a common moral imperative (and 
framework) between leaders, participants, and com-
munities to jointly focus on difficult problems (e.g., 
social injustices and inequalities) and develop ethically 
substantive solutions. In this respect, it is predictable 
that a weakened sense of moral imperative rooted 
within the current framework of leader production 
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readily succumbs to institutional conformity. It toler-
ates and even unknowingly contributes to social injus-
tices (e.g., the expansion of social inequalities). This is 
a highly controversial thing to say, but without pur-
poseful ethical leadership centered within a common, 
transcendent moral framework (Spears and Loomis, 
2007) the model cannot match the force of institution-
al conformity moving in the opposite direction.
As today’s expansion of social inequalities between 
groups of people indicates, schooling today—largely 
subject to a technical model of production (Rodriguez 
et al., 2007)—is presently incapable of rejecting and 
expelling what is degrading and enslaving. The brief 
history of conformity suggests why this is so. The 
social theorists Max Weber, George Mead, and Erving 
Goffman each chronicled various social and psycho-
logical reasons why people conform to their environ-
ments. Weber (1997) suggested that it was through a 
rational response to a centrally controlled bureaucracy 
and division of labor; Mead (1934) suggested that it 
was impulses acting in accord with the organic condi-
tions of environment; and Goffman (1959) thought 
that it was a characteristic of impression management 
through skilled theatrical conformity within societal 
norms. More recently, Ritzer (rev. 2004) suggests that 
as institutions expand, they will increasingly use ratio-
nal principles to manage growth; as with the fast-food 
restaurant McDonalds (Ritzer’s principal example), 
they will franchise like-units of production that oper-
ate under the same standardized rules of rationaliza-
tion. People serving within such institutions naturally, 
even quite rationally, respond to those formal and in-
formal incentives. And scale and scarcity strip out all 
other incentives that operate contrary to this rational 
direction. The institution not only sorts out valuable 
information in processes of production, it also sorts 
out leaders of virtue and replaces these with managers 
of demand (Tyack and Hansot, 1982). In this regard, 
Fullan (2003) appears to take for granted the power of 
institutional conformity in public education:
Everyone, ultimately, has a stake in the caliber of 
schools, and [that] education is everyone’s business. 
The quality of the public education system relates 
directly to the quality of life that people enjoy…with a 
strong public education system as the cornerstone of a 
civil, prosperous, and democratic society. (p. 7)
It is a reliable assumption today that institutional con-
formity affects the production processes of education, 
incrementally reducing the quality of education not 
enhancing it (Bowles and Gintis, 1976; Rodriguez et 
al., 2007). By extension, conformity to the procedural 
rules of educational production reduces the quality of 
life by making the education good appear simple in 
nature, a good whose production is easily managed 
by the right technique (Ellul 1964) and bureaucracy 
(Weber 1997). One clear example is when student iden-
tity and value is reducible to a test score or fungible to 
financial gains in the average-daily-attendance ac-
counting of students. Dewey saw this long ago and re-
markably anticipated our present situation: “We know 
that our present scheme of industry requires at hand 
a large supply of cheap, unskilled labor. We know that 
this precludes special training: that education which 
should develop initiative, thoughtfulness and execu-
tive force would not turn out recruits for our present 
system. And, if we are honest, we know that it is not 
intended that these shall be turned out in numbers ex-
cept such as may be required to take charge of running 
the machinery to which the masses are subordinate” 
(pp. 288-289). Yet conformity to prevailing institu-
tional information in curricula, pedagogy, and policy 
is incompatible with human complexity; and com-
plexity is what human education is all about. In times 
past, taking account of complexity in education was a 
paramount leadership obligation (Tyack and Hansot 
1982). That is not true today; procedural uniformities 
lift this obligation by regulating management through 
hierarchical rules enforced by bureaucracy, effectively 
socializing risk out to a group and not lodging it into 
any particular leader; this way no one person is as-
signed accountability.
There is, of course, a significant cost buried in how 
education is produced today. This cost is both seen (e.g, 
in inequality) and unseen (e.g., an underproduction 
of the good). Hank Levin’s (2005) work at Columbia 
University, including the working paper from Levin’s 
symposium, “The Social Costs of Inadequate Educa-
tion,” reveals in financial terms these costs (multiple 
billions of dollars). Social inequalities in certain seg-
ments of the U.S. population (e.g., between Latinos and 
Whites; Fry, 2005) are expanding or remaining static, 
not declining, thus calling into question linkages and 
franchising by Fullan and others of public education’s 
relationship to civility, prosperity, and democracy. 
Charles Glenn (1988) has dealt with this misconcep-
tion of public education in his historical analysis of 
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the common school movement in the United States, 
Netherlands and France. Glenn notes the original 
consensus built around the moral imperative of virtue 
is different than today’s moral pluralism:
The difference is that, in Horace Mann’s day, the moral 
objectives of the school were essentially congruent 
with those of the public, but this is no longer the case. 
Mann drew upon a consensus of right and wrong that, 
as he often pointed out, was largely independent of 
the diverse religious convictions of the times…This 
consensus on the moral content of education no longer 
exists. (p. 8 )
Implications for the Development of Ethical Leader-
ship
For an effective leader to develop transformational 
change within a norm-maintaining institution a 
structural loosening to modest market1 mechanisms is 
needed in order to disperse and differentiate decision-
making (Sowell, 1980). New Zealand, for example, 
decentralized its institution of education with promis-
ing results (Thrupp and Smith, 1999). The direction 
of information within public education system in the 
U.S. is not organized around principles of decentral-
ization, principles still available within market struc-
tures and the types of accountability generally arising 
from market forces (though these too are progressively 
disappearing2). U.S. public education is insulated 
from liberal market principles and sources, creating 
a system more capable of protecting status quo politi-
cal interests than in transformational change at any 
level: individual, school or societal. Politicians and 
others maintain the institutional status quo by seek-
ing to keep the most powerful groups happy in order 
to secure gains (e.g., reelection); boards of education 
retain power by supporting and rubber stamping 
administrative agenda; unions protect against change 
through collective bargaining, generous retirement 
arrangements, and protective tenure laws; all parties 
make a deal and families affixed to the system for a 
lack of other opportunities conform to the incentives 
set before them (Weeres, 1993).
In a now famous paper, John Chubb and Terry Moe 
(1986) explain best the nature of the public educa-
tion system as a norm-maintaining institution. They 
deserve to be cited at some length.
Public schools, then, are largely sheltered from mar-
ket forces. They are sectoral monopolists within their 
own districts, they draw students from a semi-captive 
constituency, and the number of students they attract 
is not highly sensitive to changes in the quality of 
education they provide. They are sheltered even fur-
ther by the fact that their funding comes from political 
authorities via taxation, not from parents as a fee for 
services rendered. Thus, financial “rewards” are largely 
separated from school performance. Parents may 
complain about the quality of education, and some 
may even pull their children out, but the financial 
well-being of the schools is determined by the poli-
cies of politicians and administrators, many of whom 
are quite far removed from the local school. And the 
democratically ordained constituency to which they 
respond is far larger and less directly affected than the 
school’s relatively small set of parents and students. (p. 
9)
The cost of negative forms of conformity in education-
al leadership is twofold. First, leaders lose the capacity 
to make decisions in conflict with institutional incen-
tive structures and this tends to turn leaders of virtue 
into mere managers of demand. Second, conformity 
has roots that run deep within the information econo-
my of the institution, which signals that bureaucracies 
are not merely locations of special interests, but are 
also locations of information dissipation. Both of these 
combine to show that the institution suffers a signifi-
cant loss of creativity and innovation (Freire, 1997; 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), which hampers valuable en-
trepreneurial activity (Schumpeter, 1950). Correcting 
this structural problem is no easy matter. Nonetheless, 
we propose three areas where authentic reevaluation 
might bring about transformational change within the 
system of education, thus allowing school administra-
tors to be ethical and transformational leaders. For 
space reasons this is not the place to fully explicate the 
details of the suggestions or unpack the implications of 
the changes (that would take a book), but it does allow 
us to propose initial ideas to spur the development of 
Ethical Leadership.
First, there must be structural changes made to pub-
lic education that allow some measures of account-
ability to modest, liberal market forces. A market and 
its assumption of self-interest are thought by many 
educationists to contradict a free and public education. 
However, there is another way to look at a market: 
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as producing a complex informational environment 
that is sensitive to the free, voluntary and responsible 
interactions among individuals and between individu-
als and groups (Rothbard, 2005). As such, a market 
can liberalize an institution from intransigent inter-
ests and, at the same time, is highly accountable to 
a broader range of participants (including teachers, 
parents and students). In fact, as Hess (2004) has prop-
erly noted, a thoughtfully arranged market can open 
an institution like education to new leadership talent; 
not one specifically built along a profit motive (or its 
equivalent in test scores), rather one that can attract 
talented people who understand the human complexi-
ty of education. Many proponents of the No Child Left 
Behind Act (2001) get excited about the new account-
ability rules of mandatory testing, but this system 
with its bureaucratic regulations gives a false sense of 
accountability. Whether a school “Meets Expectations” 
or “Does Not Meet Expectation” matters less when the 
expectations are fiercely narrow in range; unless there 
is a diversity of provision built into the system, expec-
tations will remain tightly uniform. Adding layers of 
bureaucracy leads a system more prone to the negative 
forces of conformity. Breaking loose from entrenched 
bureaucratic practices tends to liberate decision mak-
ing where accountability and opportunity may be 
assumable where they belong: closer to the actual point 
of exchange in the production of the good.
Second, leadership training and education prepara-
tion programs should be reformed to allow variation 
in decision-making. Chubb and Moe affirm, “The 
key to effective education rests with unleashing the 
productive potential that is already present in schools 
and their personnel” (p. 187). This positive hope seems 
muddled when considering the forthright analysis 
of Arthur Levine’s report, Educating School Leaders 
(2005). He laments over this fact:
The field of educational administration is deeply 
troubled…The result is a field rooted neither in prac-
tice nor research, offering programs that fail to prepare 
school leaders for their jobs, while producing research 
that is ignored by policy makers and practitioners and 
looked down on by academics both inside and outside 
of education schools. (p. 61)
Levine collapses these problems into the previous 
systemic problem by saying, “These weaknesses are 
exacerbated by public school policies that tie teacher 
and administrator salaries to longevity on the job and 
the accrual of graduate credits and degrees” (p. 61). 
Perhaps some combination of educational change will 
bring about significant change in the preparation pro-
cess of our leaders. Levine even suggests that “it would 
be best if education schools and their educational ad-
ministration programs took the lead in bringing about 
improvement” (p. 69). This also could be problematic 
considering the current state of education schools and 
the academic conformity within these programs as 
described by Hess and Kelly (2005):
Preparation programs seem particularly unprepared 
to help principals tackle the challenges of leading…
Programs are training principals to do the things they 
have traditionally been empowered to do-monitor 
curricula, support and encourage faculty, manage 
facilities, and so on-but do little to equip them to take 
advantage of tools newly available to school leaders…
resulting in micromanagement, poor decisions or the 
misuse of accountability instruments. (p. 40)
Nevertheless, education schools and training programs 
must take the lead by creating their own change. They 
should develop a broad and rigorous curriculum and 
program based on the best research and data with 
an emphasis on what education can learn from other 
areas of academia (Labaree, 2004). Education schools 
can set higher standards for the applicants into these 
programs. This may seem elitist, but evidence from 
Levine’s study strongly supports the claim that educa-
tion schools have low standards and accept low achiev-
ers (Clifford and Guthrie, 1988). Tightening entrance 
requirements will have fewer people obtaining doctor-
al degrees, which works against degree-inflation of the 
institution of education and works against expanding 
the highly popular Ed.D. programs.
Finally, there is something to be said for effective 
leadership and those leaders within the context of 
the current situation. Chubb and Moe (1990) suggest 
that “effective schools seem to be headed by principals 
who have a clear vision of where they are going…” (p. 
84). Therefore, it is important for leaders to develop a 
clear transformational vision. Unlike Fullan’s expec-
tation to tap into people’s moral imperative, Chubb 
and Moe seem to suggest that the leader develops the 
vision for the system under their span of control. Their 
research shows that “principals in academically suc-
cessful schools gave higher priority to gaining control 
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over their school’s curriculum, gaining control over 
their school’s personnel, and gaining control over their 
school’s policies” (p. 84). This conclusion has held up 
over time (U.S. DoE, 2002).
Conclusion: The Courage to Transform
The capturing of information and agenda requires a 
certain measure of political cache and entrepreneurial 
skill. How does cultural change occur? On the super-
natural level, fervent individual and community prayer 
(Matt. 5-6) and diligent and integral training of the 
mind (Phil. 2:5) coupled with just action (Ps. 4; Is. 1; 
Mich 6:8) helps to change individuals and societies. 
On the natural level in terms of setting forth a new 
and more just equilibrium for the institution of educa-
tion, Nobel economist Doug North (2005, pp. 106-107) 
traces one procedure for incremental change that is a 
plausible model for schools of education. It proceeds 
thus:
1. A set of…entrepreneurs articulate a new set of be
    liefs in fundamental conflict with the existing or-
    der—beliefs that are held, at first, by a small minority.
2. The opponents of these entrepreneurs act in ways 
    [radical opposition, etc.] that make these beliefs 
    appear true, thus confirming the revolutionary be
    liefs in the eyes of pivotal players. Thus events be
    yond the direct control of the new ideas proponents 
    occur that lend some credence to these beliefs.
3. The result is a spread of the beliefs to some of the 
    pivotal decision makers. When the pivotal decision 
    makers accept the radically new beliefs, they provide 
    sufficient political support for radical action.
In addition, command over information and the 
parameters of leadership must be rooted in something 
other than one’s self (e.g., a charisma or power); it must 
be girded by the restraining vigor of a legitimate and 
reliable moral force. C.S. Lewis (1943) explains it best 
when he argues for an adherence to the Tao in his 
book The Abolition of Man3. Lewis writes,
Either we are rational spirit obliged for ever to obey 
the absolute values of the Tao, or else we are mere 
nature to be kneaded and cut into new shapes for the 
pleasures of masters who must, by hypothesis, have 
no motive but their own “natural” impulses. Only the 
Tao provides common human law of action which can 
overarch rulers and ruled alike. A dogmatic belief in 
objective value is necessary to the very idea of a rule 
which is not tyranny or an obedience which is not 
slavery. (p. 21)
Lewis’s proposal of adherence to the Tao more ac-
curately aligns genuine leadership with reality than 
does the popular model of effective leadership. Lewis 
argues that the leader must derive his or her purpose, 
vision and power from the unchanging Tao rather 
than from institutional trends, special interests, or the 
leader himself and herself. The Tao creates opportunity 
for transformation to occur in the direction of human 
flourishing because it sets people free to seek legitimate 
change rather than merely responding to a hyper-
ordinate system or tethered to a sort of professional 
servitude.
To be authentically ethical, leaders must search for, 
find, and then lead within the Tao and adhere to the 
demanding requisites of objective ethics. Doing so will 
center human and social capital development in the 
best ideals of humanity, as well as to constrain inhu-
man structures and rules. When an educational leader 
does this, they arguably possess greater liberty of ac-
tion to do the right thing; they have an opportunity to 
amend the values, vision and objectives of the greater 
institution—as well as the modes, methods, and mis-
sions of individual schools—making these transpar-
ently and transformatively ethical. This is the platform 
from which to build higher-performing schools and 
develop transformational change. Where Fullan’s 
leader is likely to conform, particularly under the 
crushing press and power of institutional rules, Lewis’s 
leader may yet succeed because s/he understands, 
operates without fear and has unleashed the trans-
forming power of the Tao (for a parallel argument, see 
King, 1986).
Notes
1. By market, we do not mean principles of business. 
    There is far too much of that occurring in education 
    today. Rather, by market we mean the information 
    market that exists in all public and private institu
    tions. Liberalizing these will allow for more infor
    mation and greater freedom of decision-making.
2. There is a public-private convergence occurring 
    across all markets of information, leaving progres-
    sively little to distinguish public institutions from 
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    private ones. See Rodrigues et al., The Cost of 
    Institutions.
3. Lewis here is speaking about the first principles of 
    moral law to which all are subject. He writes that 
    this natural law “in all its forms, Platonic, Aristote
    lian, Stoic, Christian, Oriental alike, I shall hence
    forth refer to for brevity simply as, ‘the Tao’”. (p. 31).
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